今天推荐的两篇论文均来自《Advances in International Accounting》中文译名又叫《国际会计进展》。
第一篇由Lee, Han, Wu 和Chow等四位学者合作完成的《公司治理和投资者对报告收益的反应：对中国上市公司的探索性研究》。
题目：Corporate Governance and Investor Reaction to Reported Earnings: an Exploratory Study of Listed Chinese Companies
作者：Dominica Suk-yee Lee, Jerry Han, Woody Wu and Chee W. Chow
来源：Advances in International Accounting, Volume 18, 1–25
摘要：This study explores the determinants of listed Chinese companies’ governance practices. It also examines how these companies’ governance practices affect domestic investors’ reaction to their earnings reports. Using publicly disclosed financial information and data directly collected from 148 domestically listed Chinese companies, the findings are consistent with investors in these companies basing their valuation decisions, at least in part, on these companies’ earnings reports. This is indicated by the significant relationship between ‘‘unexpected’’ earnings and cumulative abnormal returns. However, the hypothesized effects of governance practice/choice are, on the whole, not supported. There also is no systematic relation between governance choice and ownership structure. We interpret these findings to imply that in the Chinese securities market, the institutional factors and infrastructure (e.g., legal liability, information intermediation, market for managers, and takeovers) are not yet sufficiently developed to permit individual domestic investors to exert significant influence via their actions in the capital markets.
题目：Experimental Judgments about Related-Party Disclosures in China
作者：Joseph J. Schultz Jr. and Yunwei Tang
期刊：Advances in International Accounting, Volume 17, 31–54
摘要：Over the past quarter century China has moved from a state-controlled economy to one that relies increasingly on market-based financing. The development of accounting principles and regulation has escalated since the trading of shares began in 1990 (Lin & Feng, 2001). Some descriptive studies portray the extent to which published financial statements comply with readily observable disclosure requirements (Xiao, 1999). However, there is little evidence about how disclosure judgments are made. Some observers indicate that experimental evidence may be most appropriate in determining how accounting standards are applied, particularly in different cultures and with different incentives (Nelson, 2003; Pownall & Schipper, 1999).
The current study gathers judgments from over 200 experienced accountants facing mixed incentives for reporting required related party disclosures. The incentives are derived from conditions distilled from China’s environment to develop two realistic cases. To set expectations about disclosure judgment, theoretical arguments are provided about China’s setting relative to settings in countries that have considerable history with market-based financing. Internal accountants (chief accounting officers – CAOs) and external auditors (CPAs) provide their judgments about the same cases to study how the incentives within their roles affect their judgments. One case portrays a CAO and one a CPA to allow for detection of how the participating practitioners perceive the different roles affecting expected disclosure behavior.
Irrespective of respondent status, results show that conflict-laden incentives are likely to result in less than full disclosure of required related party information. Practicing auditors report that the CPA auditor portrayed in the cases will more likely insist on disclosure than the CAO portrayed in the cases. This finding is driven by the participating CPAs reporting a higher probability that the CPA portrayed in the cases would insist on disclosure to a greater extent than the CAO portrayed in the cases. This finding suggests that auditors are likely to improve the quality of financial reporting in China.