西方会计期刊中的中国问题研究系列4

今天推荐的两篇论文均来自《Advances in International Accounting》中文译名又叫《国际会计进展》。

1.公司治理和投资者对报告收益的反应：对中国上市公司的探索性研究》。

第一篇由Lee, Han, Wu 和Chow等四位学者合作完成的《公司治理和投资者对报告收益的反应：对中国上市公司的探索性研究》。

这篇论文探讨了中国上市公司治理实践的决定因素。它还考察了这些公司的治理实践如何影响国内投资者对其收益报告的反应。

根据直接收集的148家国内上市公司公开披露的财务信息和数据，这篇论文研究发现这些财务信息和数据与这些公司的投资者基于其估值决策（至少部分基于这些公司的收益报告）是一致的。 “意外”收入与累计超额收益之间的显着关系表明了这一点。然而，总体而言，治理实践/选择的假设效应是不被支持的。治理选择与所有权结构之间也没有系统的关系。

这篇论文的研究结论意味着在中国证券市场中，制度因素和基础设施（如法律责任，信息中介，管理人员市场和收购）尚未得到充分发展，以使个人国内投资者能够通过其在资本市场上采取行动。

题目：Corporate Governance and Investor Reaction to Reported Earnings: anExploratory Study of Listed Chinese Companies

作者：Dominica Suk-yee Lee, Jerry Han, Woody Wu and Chee W. Chow

来源：Advances in International Accounting, Volume 18, 1–25

摘要：This study explores the determinants of listed Chinese companies’governance practices. It also examines how these companies’ governancepractices affect domestic investors’ reaction to their earnings reports. Usingpublicly disclosed financial information and data directly collected from 148domestically listed Chinese companies, the findings are consistent withinvestors in these companies basing their valuation decisions, at least inpart, on these companies’ earnings reports. This is indicated by thesignificant relationship between ‘‘unexpected’’ earnings and cumulativeabnormal returns. However, the hypothesized effects of governancepractice/choice are, on the whole, not supported. There also is no systematicrelation between governance choice and ownership structure. We interpret thesefindings to imply that in the Chinese securities market, the institutionalfactors and infrastructure (e.g., legal liability, information intermediation,market for managers, and takeovers) are not yet sufficiently developed topermit individual domestic investors to exert significant influence via theiractions in the capital markets.

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第二篇由Schultz Jr.和Tang共同完成的《关于中国关联方披露的实证性判断》。

在过去的二十五年间，中国已经从计划经济转向市场经济。自从1990年股票交易开始以来，会计原则和监管的发展已经升级（Lin＆Feng，2001）。一些描述性研究描述了公布的财务报表符合容易观察到的披露要求的程度（Xiao，1999）。然而，几乎没有证据表明如何做出披露判断。一些观察家指出，实验证据可能最适用于确定如何应用会计标准，特别是在不同文化和不同激励下（Nelson，2003; Pownall＆Schipper，1999）。

这篇论文的研究收集了来自200多位经验丰富的会计师的判断，面临着报告所需关联方披露的混合激励。这些激励措施来源于中国环境提取的条件，以两个现实的案例作为研究对象。这篇论文基于设定对披露判断的期望，提供了与具有相当历史和市场经济为背景的国家不同的，有关中国的理论论据。

一个案例研究，内部会计师（首席会计官（CAO）和外部审计师（CPA））对同一案例作出判断，研究角色中的激励措施如何影响他们的判断。一个案例描绘了一个CAO和一个CPA，以便检测参与的从业者如何看待影响预期披露行为的不同角色。

论文研究发现，无论受访者身份如何，结果都表明冲突性激励措施可能导致所需关联方信息的披露不足。执业审计师报告说，案件中描述的注册会计师审计师将更可能坚持披露而不是案件中描绘的CAO。研究还发现由参与会计师事务所报告的案例中所描述的注册会计师所坚持的披露程度较高的可能性较高。从而表明，审计师可能会提高中国财务报告的质量

题目：Experimental Judgments about Related-Party Disclosures in China

作者：Joseph J. Schultz Jr. and Yunwei Tang

期刊：Advances in International Accounting, Volume 17, 31–54

摘要：Over the past quarter century China has moved from astate-controlled economy to one that relies increasingly on market-basedfinancing. The development of accounting principles and regulation hasescalated since the trading of shares began in 1990 (Lin & Feng, 2001).Some descriptive studies portray the extent to which published financialstatements comply with readily observable disclosure requirements (Xiao, 1999).However, there is little evidence about how disclosure judgments are made. Someobservers indicate that experimental evidence may be most appropriate indetermining how accounting standards are applied, particularly in differentcultures and with different incentives (Nelson, 2003; Pownall & Schipper,1999).

Thecurrent study gathers judgments from over 200 experienced accountants facingmixed incentives for reporting required related party disclosures. Theincentives are derived from conditions distilled from China’s environment to develop two realistic cases. To set expectationsabout disclosure judgment, theoretical arguments are provided about China’s setting relative to settings in countries that have considerablehistory with market-based financing. Internal accountants (chief accountingofficers – CAOs) and external auditors (CPAs) providetheir judgments about the same cases to study how the incentives within theirroles affect their judgments. One case portrays a CAO and one a CPA to allowfor detection of how the participating practitioners perceive the differentroles affecting expected disclosure behavior.

Irrespectiveof respondent status, results show that conflict-laden incentives are likely toresult in less than full disclosure of required related party information.Practicing auditors report that the CPA auditor portrayed in the cases willmore likely insist on disclosure than the CAO portrayed in the cases. Thisfinding is driven by the participating CPAs reporting a higher probability thatthe CPA portrayed in the cases would insist on disclosure to a greater extentthan the CAO portrayed in the cases. This finding suggests that auditors arelikely to improve the quality of financial reporting in China.